

# How Many at the Table? Size Variation of National Delegations to Plenary Meetings of International Organizations

VÁCLAV VLČEK

Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

---

E-MAIL

vaclav.vlcek@fsv.cuni.cz

---

ORCID

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4280-3085>

---

ABSTRACT

This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegations to plenary meetings of international organizations. Plenaries are supreme decision-making bodies representing a symbol of national sovereignty as all member states of the given organization can participate in the negotiations and collective decision-making. However, this article argues that the right to participate in plenaries is utilized differently by different countries, which may have political and normative implications for international organizations and global governance as such. Drawing upon an actor-centred institutionalist approach and a newly created dataset covering seventeen plenary meetings, I suggest there is considerable variation in the delegation size caused by country-based factors. Namely, financial capacities, ideational capacities and national interests motivate states to delegate more representatives. In contrast, regional partnerships enable countries to rely on their partners and delegate fewer representatives. Finally, administrative capacities, the nature of the domestic political regime, and the institutional design of international organizations have no or only an inconclusive effect in this regard.

---

KEYWORDS

international organizations, international negotiations, plenary meetings, national delegations, delegation size

---

DOI

<https://doi.org/10.32422/mv-cjir.1684>

---

Plenary meetings are the supreme authorities of international organizations (IOs), making the most crucial decisions on international norms. Moreover, plenary meetings represent the principle of national sovereignty as they treat all member states as equal, with the same right to participate, negotiate, be heard in the discussions and, most importantly, take part in the joint decision-making. In many IOs, for example in the UN General Assembly, the principle of sovereign equality is also reflected by the voting procedure, which provides every country with one vote irrespective of its size or the extent of its financial contributions to the common budget. Yet, this does not apply to the size of the national delegations. The UN Charter specifies that *“each member state shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly”* (UNITED NATIONS 2020A). However, the internal rules of procedure allow the member states to delegate extra delegation members, up to five alternate representatives and *“as many advisers, technical advisers, experts and persons of similar status as may be required by the delegation”* (UNITED NATIONS 2020B). As a result, each country can delegate as many national representatives as is possible and desirable. Such a situation, however, places demands on member states and creates inequalities already at the early stage of the multilateral negotiations and collective decision-making. Why?

Multilateral negotiations are often demanding, time-consuming and complex. There are several working groups dealing with very technical agendas, and multiple players pursuing their own, often contradictory, policy objectives. Not to mention that political deals and compromises are often made informally in the corridors of the conference venue or neighbouring cafés and restaurants. The amount of human resources is thus crucial for whether a national delegation can manage all the complexity and come out as a winner from the negotiations. Only sufficiently large delegations can do so, as the US Department of State reported to the Senate Committee on Appropriations (1979): *“We think further reductions [in the size of US delegations] remain possible but there will be a point where we will not be able to continue to reduce the size of many delegations without affecting adversely their ability to represent effectively the United States interests.”* Moreover, there is also a normative aspect of the issue. The primary clients of IOs are most often low-income countries (PARIZEK 2017) lacking the necessary resources to get sufficiently represented. International norms adopted under the shadow of unfairness, or even illegitimacy, may undermine low-income states’ willingness to implement the norms and, as a result, undermine the global governance as such. The aim of this article, therefore, is to map

*to what extent national delegations to plenary meetings of IOs vary in terms of their size and what factors can explain such a variation.*

So far, we know precious little about national delegations and their size despite the significance of this matter and its potential political implications. As Finnemore and Jurkovich (2014: 369) argue: “[d]elegates lists [...] do not excite most students of global governance.” Existing studies use delegation size mostly as an explanatory factor, usually as a proxy for national capacities, to explain the weak positions of small and developing countries in multilateral negotiations (MUMMA 2000; CHASEK 2001; RICHARDS 2001; MINANG 2009; MAKINA 2013; PANKE 2013A). Empirical evidence also shows that some countries increase the numbers of their delegates intentionally to alter the balance in international negotiations, as this is the case, for instance, with emerging powers in UNESCO (BERTACCHINI – LIUZZA – MESKELL 2017), or to put emphasis on vital national interests, as in the cases of small and island states in climate change negotiations (BETZOLD – CASTRO – WEILER 2012).

This paper, by contrast, puts delegation size in the limelight, complementing scarce existing findings, formulating a comprehensive theoretical approach and analysing a new, manually compiled, extensive dataset covering an unprecedented number of plenary meetings. The descriptive results show that there is a considerable variation in delegation size across countries and IOs and also across the individual delegations of one state to different IOs. I show that the patterns behind the variation reflect mainly country-based characteristics. First, states with higher financial capacities tend to delegate more national representatives to plenary meetings than their poorer counterparts. Second, countries with more experience with the agendas and internal procedures of the particular IOs tend to delegate larger groups to plenary meetings than less experienced and knowledgeable member states. Third, national interests play a considerable role. Countries with multiple interests at stake delegate more nationals to plenary meetings than less interested states. Fourth, regional partnerships motivate states to rely more on their like-minded partners and save some financial and human resources. Countries participating in a higher number of regional projects send smaller delegations to plenary meetings than states which regionally cooperate seldom or not at all. Contrary to expectations, the results show that national administrative capacities and institutional design of IOs do not have any impact on how many representatives national governments delegate to plenary meetings of IOs. The nature of the domestic

political regime then provides some statistically significant results which are, however, in contradiction to the hypothesis, indicating that states with a lower level of electoral democracy tend to delegate more national representatives than countries with a higher level of electoral democracy.

The article continues as follows. In the first section, I elaborate on the scarce existing literature treating delegation size as a dependent variable. The second section develops the theoretical framework, building on the actor-centred institutionalist approach. In the following section, I present the data, their operationalization and the data sources. The fifth section provides descriptive statistics, regression models and their results. Finally, in the last section, I summarize the findings and debate their practical and normative implications for IOs and global governance as such.

## NATIONAL DELEGATION SIZE IN THE LIMELIGHT

Only little scholarly work treats delegation size as a dependent variable and studies which do so are usually limited in terms of IOs which they focus on, or the set of explanatory factors. In an important early statement, Keohane <sup>(1969)</sup> descriptively maps regional and ideological patterns in numbers of national delegates in the United Nations General Assembly. However, as the research comes from the Cold War era, it barely reflects today's reality. From the recent scholarly work, Schroeder, Boykoff and Spiers <sup>(2012)</sup>, Neeff <sup>(2013)</sup> and Skovgaard and Gallant <sup>(2015)</sup> focus on the sizes of national delegations in the Conferences of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. All the authors identify a rapid increase in attendance. Furthermore, Schroeder, Boykoff and Spiers <sup>(2012)</sup> emphasize cross-country variation and a considerable gap between the G8+5 countries<sup>1</sup> and small developing states. The authors argue that less interested states and poor countries get represented by smaller delegations than the wealthy and interested ones <sup>(SCHROEDER – BOYKOFF – SPIERS 2012)</sup>. Neeff <sup>(2013)</sup> finds evidence for his networking hypothesis, arguing that anticipation of a large conference lures a larger number of participants. On the contrary, however, his results do not show any correlation between the number of participants on one hand, and flight ticket prices and the attractiveness of the conference location on the other.

Additionally, Minor <sup>(2020)</sup> pays attention to institutional settings of multilateral disarmament negotiations, arguing that some forums are more inclusive than others as they offer financial support for the poorest countries

and a greater opportunity for smaller and less powerful states to pursue their own interests. Similarly, treaty review conferences get substantially more attention than ordinary annual meetings. In line with the previous findings, Minor (2020) also argues that national preferences as well as national income matter too. Referring to interviews with practitioners, the author adds that groupings and alliances, which are able to represent a collective position on behalf of their members, have an impact on states' decisions as to how many nationals they should delegate. Finally, Onderco (2019) presents a more in-depth statistical analysis focused on national delegations in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Drawing upon the liberal theory of international regimes, the author provides evidence for his argument that national interests and wealth determine the numbers of representatives which national governments delegate to multilateral negotiations. In the following section, I will attempt to outline a comprehensive theoretical framework covering more IOs than the authors mentioned above and incorporating (not only) existing findings in one model.

## CAPACITIES, ORIENTATIONS, CONSTELLATIONS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Plenary meetings (usually called general assemblies, general conferences or ministerial meetings) are plenary bodies representing all member states of the given IO (RITTBERGER ET AL. 2019: 60–64). As any other platform for multilateral negotiations, plenary meetings are characterized by considerable complexity resulting from the multiplicity of actors having multiple interests in multiple policy issues, and playing multiple roles (ZARTMAN 1994). Active and effective participation in such negotiations is thus very costly “*as it requires staff (diplomats, experts, lawyers) at the negotiation table*” (PANKE 2017A: 128). Small delegations can hardly manage all the complexity, participate in all the (often simultaneous) meetings and be active in last-minute overnight marathon sessions seeking a final deal. Negotiation by exhaustion impacts primarily on smaller and less wealthy delegations while larger delegations can establish a rota system and cover all or most of the meetings by well-rested representatives (YAMIN – DEPLEDGE 2004; DEPLEDGE 2005). As Lohman (2006: 50) nicely illustrates it: “*In the 2000 UNFCCC climate negotiations in The Hague, to take one example, the US fielded 150 well-equipped delegates, housing them in a luxury hotel and sending well-rested and well-briefed representatives to every working group meeting, while Mozambique had to put up its three harried delegates in a noisy youth hostel occupied largely by Chinese tourists.*”

This paper will draw upon actor-centred institutionalism (SCHARPF 1997) to explain why different countries delegate different numbers of national representatives to plenary meetings. This theoretical framework assumes that political behaviour results from the interaction between self-interested actors (characterized by their capacities and preferences) operating in an institutional context (rules and norms, be they formal or informal) which does not constrain (POLLACK 2006; SHEPSLE 2010), or constitute (CHECKEL 2001; WENDT 2001), but structures the set of actions which the actors may choose (SCHARPF 1997). In line with this reasoning, member states, as the crucial political actors in IOs, are assumed to decide on the sizes of their delegations based on their national capacities and preferences with respect to the membership and institutional design of the particular IO.

As illustrated above, the transactions costs in the complex environment of plenary meetings are very high and states which lack capacities lag behind their wealthier counterparts. To take one example, Panke (2014) demonstrates that countries with fewer financial, political, ideational and staff capacities often do not make use of their right to vote in the final stage of the decision-making process in IOs. Similarly, I expect national capacities to be a crucial factor for delegation size. First, financial capacities are of key importance, as they are necessary to build a functional ministry of foreign affairs with a well-paid, qualified staff and a robust diplomatic corps. Countries with a high GDP, for example, speak up more often and more proactively in international negotiations than states with lower financial capacities (PANKE 2017A). Similarly, rich countries place disproportionately more of their nationals in international bureaucracies to increase their ability to control IOs (PARIZEK 2017). Therefore, I hypothesize that *states with higher financial capacities delegate more national representatives to plenary meetings of IOs than less wealthy countries* (H1). Second, to be successful in negotiations, national delegations need to have clear, well formulated and timely instructions from the capital and skilfully transform them into the collective policy outcomes. Recent studies show that effective administrative and diplomatic personnel are more active (PANKE 2017A) and deliver better results in international negotiations (PANKE 2013A, 2013B). Furthermore, states with an effective administrative apparatus implement adopted policies more successfully (TOSUN 2014; SURUBARU 2017). Hence, well prepared countries with skilful representatives can utilize their advantage at the expense of less effectively working states and reach more favourable policy outcomes. As a result, it is expected that *states with more effective administrative capacities delegate more national representatives*

*to plenary meetings of IOs than less effective countries* (H2). Third, a low level of financial and administrative capacities can be compensated by a high level of knowledge of the agenda, the shared norms among the participants and the policy procedures of the particular IO. More experienced delegations can benefit from their ideational capacities, as they do, for instance, when voting in the UN General Assembly (PANKE 2014). Accordingly, I hypothesize that *countries with higher ideational capacities delegate more national representatives to plenary meetings of IOs than less experienced and knowledgeable countries* (H3).

Capacities, however, are not the only motivation for political action. Political actors also have relatively stable, yet still changeable, “orientations” (perceptions and preferences) which can be activated by a political stimulus (SCHARPF 1997: 43) – for example, the agenda of the particular IO. As the existing evidence indicates, states with national interests at stake tend to increase the sizes of their national delegations (SCHROEDER – BOYKOFF – SPIERS 2012; ONDERCO 2019; MINOR 2020). The reverse is also true; as Schroeder, Boykoff and Spiers (2012) illustrate, even the United States gets represented by an obviously smaller delegation if it feels less interested, as it did in the Conferences of Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change after the Kyoto Protocol had been adopted. Therefore, it is expected that *states with a higher interest in the agenda of the particular IO delegate more national representatives to its plenary meetings than less interested countries* (H4). Similarly, domestic institutions may encourage the government to pursue political action. From this perspective, political regimes accountable to their people and interest groups are more interested in international cooperation than less inclusive and accountable states because they are more accustomed to democratic norms of negotiation and compromise (RUSSET 1993) and their democratically elected leaders can be rewarded for their behaviour and the benefits which international cooperation brings (MANSFIELD – MILNER – ROSENDORFF 2002). The next hypothesis is, therefore, as follows: *more democratic states delegate more national representatives to plenary meetings of IOs than less accountable and inclusive regimes* (H5).

However, no political actor is able to act based only on its capacities and orientations. Policy outcomes result from specific “constellations” (SCHARPF 1997) involving multiple interacting actors. In plenary meetings, countries have different capacities and orientations, which makes the international negotiation even more complicated and the final decision

even more difficult to reach. As Zartman <sup>(1994)</sup> argues, coalitions are one of the mechanisms which can reduce complexity. Like-minded states can cooperate to make the negotiations more manageable, and increase their collective power but also to save their financial and human resources. Such cooperation is possible, for instance, on a regional basis. As Chasek <sup>(2001: 170)</sup> notes: *“It is not surprising to see only one Central American State at a meeting, speaking on behalf of all of the Central American States.”* Regionalization allows states to share financial and personnel burdens <sup>(PANKE – LANG – WIEDEMANN 2015, 2017, 2019; PANKE 2020)</sup> and simplifies complex multilateral negotiations, even in very sensitive policy areas such as security <sup>(PANKE 2017B)</sup>. Moreover, states use their regional partners and collective positions to their advantage and thus pursue their own interests <sup>(PANKE 2013B, 2020)</sup>. Therefore, I hypothesize that *countries with more regional partnerships rely more on collective representation and delegate fewer national representatives to plenary meetings than states with few or no regional partners* (H6).

Finally, all actors operate and interact within the institutional setting of the particular IO. Actor-centred institutionalism defines institutions as *“systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may choose”* <sup>(SCHARPF 1997: 38)</sup>. The institutions may be formal legal rules but also informal social norms. These, however, do not determine the actors’ behaviour. Instead, they just influence the actors and even permit alternative behaviour that is more or less acceptable within the institutional setting, including changes of the institutions themselves <sup>(SCHARPF 1997)</sup>. The political environment of IOs is usually highly institutionalized, building on a formal structure, political processes and internal rules <sup>(BATORA – HOCKING 2009)</sup>. As such, it may influence states’ motivation to delegate more or fewer national representatives to plenary meetings. First, IOs may be relatively powerful with respect to the authority delegated to them by the member states <sup>(HOOGHE ET AL. 2017; HOOGHE – LENZ – MARKS 2019)</sup>. Based on the degree of “delegation”, i.e. the degree of competencies in agenda setting, everyday decision-making, compliance monitoring, dispute settlement or non-compliance sanctioning, the member states may decide whether to reduce or increase the sizes of their national delegations. Therefore, I hypothesize that *IOs with a higher level of delegation motivate member states to send more national representatives to the plenary meetings than IOs with lower levels of delegated competencies* (H7) so that states can keep the given IOs and their competencies under control. Secondly, the plenary meetings, as



the highest decision-making bodies of IOs, are institutionalized as well. The decision-making rules, ratification procedures and (non-) binding character of the decisions constitute another level of authority – “pooling” (HOOGHE ET AL. 2017; HOOGHE – LENZ – MARKS 2019). Similarly as in the case of delegation, I hypothesize that *IOs with a higher level of pooling motivate member states to send more national representatives to the plenary meetings than IOs with lower levels of pooled decision-making procedures* (H8). Finally, to deal with the complexity emphasized at the beginning of this section, an effective delegation needs to deal with multiple actors at the table and multiple policy issues on the table. The final two hypotheses are, therefore, as follows: *the more member states IOs have, the more national representatives states are motivated to send to the plenary meetings* (H9) and, accordingly, *the more policy issues IOs deal with, the more national representatives states are motivated to send to the plenary meetings* (H10).

To summarize the theoretical model, actor-centred institutionalism believes that observable behaviour of political actors is characterized by their capacities, orientations and interactions, which are structured by the institutional context. In Section 5, I will therefore test the impact of national financial (H1), administrative (H2) and ideational (H3) capacities, national interests (H4), domestic institutions (H5) and regional partnerships (H6) within a specific institutional design (H7–H10) on states’ decisions as to how many national representatives they should send to plenary meetings of IOs.

## THE DELEGATES LIST AS A DATA SOURCE

In this section, I elaborate on individual variables, their operationalization and data sources. The data on the dependent variable has been manually compiled from the lists of participants published by the individual IOs after their regular plenary meetings which took place between the years 2014 and 2018. Plenary meetings take place regularly but not always annually. Some IOs organize the sessions only once per two or three years, which makes it impossible to map the participation every year. Based on Hooghe, Lenz and Marks’ (2019) definition of IOs,<sup>2</sup> which emphasizes their intergovernmental nature and permanent formal structure, including an assembly-like body, twenty-five international (UN and other global) organizations and their plenary meetings have been identified. Regional organizations have been omitted as their memberships are considerably

smaller and region-based so their internal dynamics, e.g. the distribution of power or preferences, among the member states could differ from those of IOs with a truly international scope. Furthermore, out of the selected IOs, eight were omitted due to data unavailability.<sup>3</sup> The final dataset thus consists of 2,933 observations covering all 193 UN member states and two non-member states receiving invitations to UN meetings (the Vatican and Palestine) across 17 IOs and their plenary meetings as presented in Table 1.

The data enable us to compare assemblies of different sizes, from small ones with an average of two delegates per member state (e.g. ISA) to much larger ones with an average delegation consisting of 14 delegates (e.g. UNESCO). Furthermore, the dataset encompasses IOs focusing on various agendas, for instance, social issues, justice, agriculture, energy, communications, culture and health. However, there are no IOs focused exclusively on security issues (e.g. NATO) or global economic governance (e.g. the IMF or the WTO). Therefore, the results should not be generalized across the whole universe of IOs. Nevertheless, this novel research is still a good starting point with a relatively high level of generalizability across IOs dealing at least with low politics issues. Moreover, some mechanisms hypothesized here have been already tested on other, less formalized international summits and conferences as mentioned in Section 2.

For analytical purposes, the data are used at the country-IO level, i.e. as the sizes of the individual national delegations to the particular plenary meetings. The dependent variable is operationalized as the total number of registered government delegates who are listed in the official reports published by the individual IOs, including everyone from the heads of delegations to delegates, alternates and advisors, be they national politicians, diplomats, permanent representatives, bureaucrats and other supporting staff. To take one example, South Korea was represented by 221 delegates in total in the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union in 2014, which makes it the largest delegation in the dataset. Member states without a single delegate were assigned the value of zero while non-member states were assigned no value and thus are not involved in the analysis.

To test the hypotheses, the data on financial resources (H1) are operationalized as GDP in US dollars (WORLD BANK 2020A) and then logarithmically transformed since they are very positively skewed. Then the

administrative capacities (H2) are captured by the government effectiveness estimate, which measures *“the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”* (KAUFMANN – KRAAY – MASTRUZZI 2011: 4; WORLD BANK 2020B).<sup>4</sup> Finally, the data on the ideational capacities (H3) reflect the length of membership operationalized as the number of years from the year a country joined an IO to the year 2014. The information is derived from the Correlates of War Project (PEVEHOUSE ET AL. 2020).

Besides the national capacities, the theoretical model hypothesizes the impact of national orientations and cross-country constellations, namely the national interests, degree of democracy and number of regional partnerships. Starting with the first variable (H4), it is very challenging to operationalize the national interests of many countries across several IOs. Therefore, it was necessary to use at least a proxy variable. This research employs a measure reflecting the media visibility of each IO in relation to its member states. Higher visibility is believed to indicate a higher relevance of the IO agenda for the particular country and thus a larger national interest in being sufficiently represented in the plenary meeting. To operationalize the proxy, the Factiva<sup>5</sup> (2020) media monitoring service and search engine were used to look for all articles in which the individual IOs (their full official name in English) have been mentioned in combination with each country (its name in English) during the last five years.<sup>6</sup> The data thus represent the number of media hits for 3315 IO-country combinations (dyads). Such an operationalization suffers from being monolingual, as it uses English names only. I discuss this methodological constraint in the Appendix and provide additional arguments which support the operationalization. For the analysis, the data were logarithmically transformed due to their strong, positive skew.<sup>7</sup> The nature of the political regime (H5) is measured by Vanhanen’s (2019) “Index of Democratization (2017)”, which combines the electoral success of small political parties and voters’ turnout as the measured variables. The higher the value of the index, the higher the level of electoral democracy in the country. Finally, the number of regional partnerships (H6) is counted as the number of such institutions a state has joined up till 2012. The data used for this variable were compiled by Panke (2017A).

At the institutional level, measures of international authority, i.e. delegation (H7) and pooling (H8), have been operationalized by Hooghe,

Lenz and Marks (2019) and this paper builds on their data. The same dataset is also used for the policy scope (H10) of the individual IOs, which combines the original variables of “core” policies and “flanking” policies (HOOGHE – LENZ – MARKS 2019). Finally, the sizes of the IO memberships (H9) are derived from the websites of the individual organizations. Summary statistics for the independent variables and a correlation matrix are available in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.

## HOW MANY DELEGATES AND WHY?

The descriptive results for the individual IOs are summarized in Table 1, including the information on 1) the name of the IO and the particular plenary meeting, 2) the IO name abbreviation, 3) the year when the particular plenary meeting took place, 4) the total number of participants of the plenary, 5) the size of the largest delegation, and 6) the average delegation size and its standard deviation. Table 1 also shows that the total number of national delegates to all seventeen plenary meetings in the dataset was 22,704. The average size of one national delegation in the dataset is close to 8, the standard deviation equals 12 and the median 4, which indicates a strong positive skew in the data. As Table 1, moreover, shows, there is a considerable delegation size variation across different IOs. Checking the individual countries, the largest national delegations, on average, come from the major global powers – the United States (1<sup>st</sup> in the ranking), Russia (4<sup>th</sup>) and China (5<sup>th</sup>). Further, there are also South Korea (2<sup>nd</sup>), Indonesia (3<sup>rd</sup>), Nigeria (6<sup>th</sup>), Japan (7<sup>th</sup>), France (8<sup>th</sup>), Kenya (9<sup>th</sup>) and Thailand (10<sup>th</sup>) among the top scorers. On the other hand, the smallest delegations come mostly from small island states. The average delegation sizes for each country are available in Table A3 in the Appendix. Finally, the descriptive results also suggest that there is a variation among the national delegations of one country to different IOs. The differences between the smallest and the largest delegation (i.e. the range) of the individual states to different IOs in the dataset range from 1 (Micronesia) to 218 (South Korea) with more than 70% of the states reporting a range larger than 10. The within-state variation in delegation size is available in Table A4 in the Appendix.

TABLE 1 – THE NUMBERS OF DELEGATES IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE SELECTED IOS

International organization (plenary meeting)	IO abbr.	Meeting date	Total number of participants	Largest delegation	Mean (sd)
Food and Agriculture Organization (Conference)	FAO	2017	975	38	5.08 (4.98)
International Atomic Energy Agency (General Conference)	IAEA	2017	2,092	104	12.45 (16.26)
International Civil Aviation Organization (Assembly)	ICAO	2016	1,812	85	9.44 (12.03)
International Criminal Court (Assembly of States Parties)	ICC	2016	679	25	5.61 (4.19)
International Labour Organization (International Labour Conference)	ILO	2018	2,274	92	12.29 (11.82)
International Maritime Organization (Assembly)	IMO	2017	1,283	70	7.46 (8.36)
International Organization for Migration (Council)	IOM	2018	430	11	2.50 (2.13)
International Seabed Authority (Assembly)	ISA	2016	300	37	1.82 (3.82)
International Telecommunication Union (Plenipotentiary Conference)	ITU	2014	2,363	221	12.24 (22.39)
International Whaling Commission (Commission)	IWC	2016	213	32	2.34 (4.08)
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (General Conference)	UNESCO	2017	2,761	96	14.38 (13.75)
United Nations (General Assembly)	UN	2017	2,420	139	12.54 (20.36)
UN Industrial Development Organization (General Conference)	UNIDO	2017	588	24	3.44 (3.68)
UN World Tourism Organization (General Assembly)	UNWTO	2017	610	30	3.84 (4.67)
World Health Organization (World Health Assembly)	WHO	2017	2,290	82	11.93 (11.40)
World Intellectual Property Organization (General Assembly)	WIPO	2016	873	26	4.57 (3.85)
World Meteorological Organization (World Meteorological Congress)	WMO	2015	741	27	4.03 (4.31)
Overall data			22,704	221	7.74 (12.01)

The descriptive results already provide some basic evidence for hypothesis H1 as almost all the top scorers are wealthy countries. However, there are also two states among the top scorers which are characterized as “low-income developing countries”<sup>8</sup> by the International Monetary Fund, namely Nigeria and Kenya. Thus, not just financial capacities, but also other factors seem to be behind states’ motivation to send national delegates to plenary meetings of IOs. Table 2 offers the results of five regression models testing the hypothesized explanations.<sup>9</sup> In Models 1–3, the standard errors have been clustered at the country level, in Model 4 at the IO level and in the most comprehensive model, Model 5, at both the country and IO level. The clustering was performed in order to avoid false conclusions based on correlations among the observation units.<sup>10</sup> The various numbers of observations in the individual models are caused by missing data on some of the country-based variables, especially on the countries’ democracy index scores and memberships in regional organizations. Therefore, Model 4, building only on institutional features, is the only one that is complete. The coefficients of the individual variables (in Table 2) represent a change in log expected counts. When exponentiated, they offer a count ratio which enables one to deduce the percentage change in the expected count for a change in an independent variable (MONOGAN 2015: 118). Since these interpretations might be quite confusing, predicted probabilities have been calculated and graphically depicted in Figure 1. Finally, standard regression diagnostics have been run for all the models reported in the article and none of them violate any regression assumptions.<sup>11</sup>

Turning to the regression results, Table 2 shows that financial capacities undoubtedly have a statistically significant and positive impact on the delegation size. Models 1, 3 and 5 consistently support hypothesis H1. Similarly, hypothesis H3 is confirmed across all the models involving the variable of ideational capacities. The results thus imply that countries with more financial resources and more experience with an IO delegate more national representatives to the particular plenary meeting than less wealthy and less experienced member states. In contrast, administrative capacities provide quite ambiguous (both positive and negative) and insignificant results, and it is impossible to credibly support hypothesis H2 based on these capacities.

Moving to national orientations and constellations among the member states, the results indicate that national interests and regional

cooperation matter. First, the variable taking the national interests into account provides strong evidence for hypothesis H4, which argues that more interested states delegate more national representatives to plenary meetings than countries with fewer national interests at stake. Models 3 and 5 provide evidence also for hypothesis H6, indicating that states calculate the resources invested in their delegations and save some if they can rely on cooperation with like-minded states. Hence, countries with more regional partners delegate fewer national representatives than states forced to act only on their own. This result is not confirmed by Model 2, which builds on the orientations- and constellations-based variables only, but it is supported by the most comprehensive model, Model 5, and also by the control models in Table A5 in the Appendix. Therefore, hypothesis H6 can be corroborated. Similarly, Models 3 and 5 provide statistically significant results for the variable reflecting the nature of the member states' political regimes. However, the coefficient is negative, which implies, in contradiction with hypothesis H5, that countries with a lower level of electoral democracy delegate more national representatives to plenary meetings than member states with a higher level of electoral democracy. To verify these results, an alternative measure of democracy<sup>12</sup> was tested. The coefficient turned out to be positive yet statistically insignificant while the other results remained stable, as presented in Model 1 in Table A5 in the Appendix. The findings about the impact of domestic political institutions thus remain ambiguous and inconclusive.

TABLE 2 – THE REGRESSION ANALYSES' RESULTS

	Model:				
	1	2	3	4	5
Financial capacities	0.235***		0.178***		0.179***
- GDP (log)	(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.035)
Administrative capacities	-0.065'		0.035		0.033
- government effectiveness index	(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.046)
Ideational capacities	0.013***		0.011***		0.009**
- membership length	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.003)
National interests		0.342***	0.184***		0.198**
- media hits (log)		(0.013)	(0.011)		(0.064)
Democracy		-0.001	-0.012***		-0.010**
- Vanhanen's index		(0.004)	(0.003)		(0.003)
Regional partnerships		-0.001	-0.047*		-0.044*
- number of regional organizations		(0.029)	(0.021)		(0.019)
Delegation					0.542
- delegation index					(0.861)
Pooling					0.860
- pooling index				(1.328)	(1.103)
Plenary size				0.010	0.006
- number of member states				(0.006)	(0.004)
Policy scope				0.065	-0.051
- number of policy areas				(0.051)	(0.061)
Constant	-4.470***	0.102	-3.601***	-0.671	-5.138***
	(0.456)	(0.147)	(0.467)	(0.613)	(1.124)
Observations	2,814	2,757	2,689	2,933	2,689
Log Likelihood	-8,222.569	-8,098.795	-7,662.172	-8,962.457	-7,614.905
theta	1.294*** (0.043)	1.163*** (0.038)	1.588*** (0.056)	0.847*** (0.025)	1.662*** (0.060)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	16,453.140	16,205.590	15,338.340	17,934.910	15,251.810
Note:	'p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				




Finally, the institutional factors do not report any significant results. Delegation (H7), pooling (H8), IO size (H9) and IO policy scope (H10) seem to have no impact on the sizes of national delegations – neither by themselves (Model 4 in Table 2), nor jointly with the country-based variables (Model 5). Neither does Model 2 in Table A5 in the Appendix, using the simplified variables “international authority”<sup>13</sup> and “plenary complexity”,<sup>14</sup> find evidence for any institutional effects. However, the conclusion about the institutional factors should remain open as the variation at the IO level is relatively low, as there are only seventeen IOs in the dataset. More IOs should be involved in any future research on national delegations’ sizes in order to verify the results presented here.

Additionally, alternative analyses have been run to test whether the results are robust. First, an index measuring national levels of corruption has been involved (in Models 3 and 4 in Table A5 in the Appendix) as a proxy for possible “conference tourism” caused by other than professional reasons.<sup>15</sup> For the purpose of the test, the variable of national administrative capacities is omitted as it is highly correlated with the corruption index. Similarly to Neeff’s <sup>(2013)</sup> results, there seems to be no tourist motivation in this case, while the effects of the core variables do not change. Second, the number of IOs which states are members of, does not provide significant results either.<sup>16</sup> As plenary meetings do not take place so often, two or more overlapping sessions, which would make states split their personnel, are rather unlikely. Third, the geographical distance from the member states to the conference venue is tested based on the expectation that states situated closer to the plenary meeting venue use the opportunity to send more national delegates as the travel costs are lower.<sup>17</sup> Yet, Model 3 in Table A5 in the Appendix shows that geographical distance has no significant impact in this regard. On the contrary, a dummy for the host countries (in Model 4 in Table A5 in the Appendix) seems to have a significantly positive effect on the delegation size, implying that hosting countries use their advantage and delegate more representatives. To illustrate this, the above-mentioned largest delegation in the dataset is the South Korean delegation to the ITU conference, which took place in Busan, South Korea. The results for the hosting country, however, suffer from the same issue as the institutional variables. Since there are only seventeen plenary meetings included, the variation is low and the results should be verified by future research building on more data. In both Model 3 and 4 in Table A5, the effects of the core variables remain stable. Finally, Model 5 in Table A5 in the Appendix involves

the individual IOs as dummies referring to the UN General Assembly. While some of the plenary meetings differ significantly from the reference assembly, the effect of the core variables, except for one, does not change. Only the ideational capacities (the length of the membership) stop being significant.

Most of the control models thus do not change the core results reflecting the hypotheses of this paper. Financial capacities, ideational capacities, national interests and regional partnerships consistently report significant results in the hypothesized way. The standardized coefficients (available in Table A6 in the Appendix), moreover, show that it is the financial capacities and national interests which have the largest effect on the delegation size compared to the relatively smaller effects of ideational capacities and regional partnerships. To interpret the effect of the coefficients, predicted probabilities have been calculated (based on Model 5 in Table 2) as they can be more easily interpreted. First, the countries with the weakest financial capacities, which correspond to small island states, e.g. Tuvalu, Nauru, or Kiribati, are predicted to delegate approximately two national representatives to plenary meetings while holding all the other variables at their averages.<sup>18</sup> By contrast, the states with the highest financial capacities like the United States are predicted to delegate around 17 nationals while holding the other variables at their average values. Second, Model 5 in Table 2 indicates that the countries with the highest ideational capacities (corresponding to the founding states of ITU) are predicted to delegate approximately 15 delegates while the states with the shortest memberships in an IO are predicted to delegate just around four nationals to the particular IO, with all other variables being constant. Third, the number of predicted national delegates gets to almost 23 for the most interested states (corresponding, for example, to China in the UN General Assembly) while other factors are held equal. In contrast, the prediction for the least interested countries is around two delegates while keeping the other independent variables at their mean. Finally, regional partnership, compared to the previous input variables, tends to decrease the sizes of national delegations. The predicted probabilities indicate that states with a membership in 11 regional organizations (corresponding to Russia, Tajikistan, Colombia or Venezuela) tend to delegate around four nationals to plenary meetings. In contrast, countries with no regional partnerships (like Israel and North Korea) are predicted to send around seven representatives to plenary meetings, with all other factors being constant. The predicted probabilities of the significant variables are graphically depicted in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 – PREDICTED NUMBERS OF NATIONAL DELEGATES TO PLENARY MEETINGS GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT FACTORS WHILE HOLDING ALL THE OTHER FACTORS AT THEIR AVERAGES. BASED ON MODEL 5 IN TABLE 2



## CONCLUSION

Compared to the previously existing research on delegates lists, this paper employs a comprehensive set of explanatory factors at different levels, compiles them in one coherent approach and applies the final theoretical model to an unprecedented number of IOs. The findings indicate that there is a considerable variation in delegation sizes across different countries and

IOs and also across delegations of one state to different IOs. The empirical research shows that some countries under some conditions delegate tens, sometimes even hundreds, of delegates. In contrast, other states delegate only a few national representatives, sometimes even none or just a single person. Based on the actor-centred institutionalist theoretical model, ten explanatory factors at different levels were tested and four of them provide strong evidence for their impact on the delegation size. First, financial capacities seem to play a substantial role when national governments decide on how many representatives to delegate to plenary meetings. The more financial resources a country possesses, the larger its delegation gets. Second, ideational capacities in the form of previous experience with the agenda and internal rules and procedures of the IO motivate countries to delegate larger groups. The longer a country is an IO member, the more representatives it delegates in order to utilize its experience in negotiations and decision-making. Third, national interests are of high importance. Countries that are intensively interested in the agenda of an IO tend to delegate more nationals to its plenary meetings. Fourth, member states act rationally and save some resources if they have like-minded partners which they can cooperate with in a plenary meeting. Countries involved in multiple regional projects tend to delegate fewer representatives than those which have no or very few regional partnerships.

In contrast, administrative capacities of the individual countries and the institutional design of the particular IOs seem to play no role in states' decisions on how many delegates to send to plenary meetings. However, the low variation on the institutional variables may provide no evidence for the IO-related explanations. Any future research on a similar topic that would be based on more data, should reassess the IO-related findings presented here. Finally, the nature of the domestic political regime provides significant, yet negative, results which, contrary to the corresponding hypothesis, indicate that states with a lower level of electoral democracy delegate more national delegates to plenary meetings. Such counterintuitive findings also leave room for future research on the role of domestic institutions in international negotiations.

Further, the research suggests that financial capacities and national interests are the main reasons why some states tend to send larger delegations to plenary meetings. The mutual relationship between these factors is a theoretical challenge worth further investigation. An intuitive

explanation would be that domestic preferences have an impact on states' behaviour in the international arena but only under specific conditions, most likely when the agenda is highly salient. Then even low-income countries get motivated and invest their scarce resources into their national delegations. By contrast, when less vital policy issues are at stake, the wealthy states dominate the negotiations at the expense of those which cannot afford to delegate a large group of national representatives. Such a hypothesis, however, needs further investigation.

Finally, the results have major political and normative implications. Decision-making procedures in plenary meetings of IOs are often at the edge of efficiency and legitimacy. Voting rules are often designed to enable at least some agreement in a reasonable amount of time, for instance through majority voting, and thus contribute to decision-making effectiveness. Adequate representation in the preceding negotiations is, however, necessarily linked to the legitimacy of IOs and the global norms adopted. A country which cannot sufficiently cover all the meetings, express its national position on a particular agenda or have a chance to influence the final policy outcome, may consider the whole decision-making procedure and its outcomes as illegitimate and, as a result, such a country may even refuse to implement the adopted international norms at home.

As the research shows, financial capacities seem to be one of the crucial factors behind the delegation size variation. Poor countries are at a massive disadvantage when trying to catch up with the pace of multiple, often overnight, negotiations about a complex agenda with a small group of representatives. In contrast, rich countries have enough financial resources to introduce a rota system and cover all the sessions with professional diplomats, officials and experts. This situation makes the legitimacy issues even more serious as the weakest developing and low-income states are usually the primary clients of IOs (PARIZEK 2017). Some IOs try to counter the under-representation of low-income states by providing them with funding to defray the costs of participation, cover administrative expenses and meet the costs of adaptation (MUMMA 2000; UNITED NATIONS 2001; BARNETT – CAMPBELL 2010: 95). However, as I have already presented, such provisions, if present, do not help to balance the numbers and most of the low-income countries still lag behind. In line with previous evidence (PANKE 2017C), the results indicate that any equalizing mechanisms in IOs are weakest in the negotiation stage of the policy cycle. Hence, any financial support still has a long way to go before it leads to equalizing of multilateral negotiations.

The results also show that low-income countries are able to counter the disadvantage, especially when they have national interests at stake or regional partners to cooperate with. To keep (at least) a sense of equal treatment, legitimacy and, as a result, compliance with international norms, IOs should implement more equalizing mechanisms related to member states' representation. Of course, a major power will most likely always delegate more representatives than a tiny island state. However, all national delegations should be able to manage all sessions related to the particular plenary meeting. The above-mentioned financial support is one way to help low-income countries to get sufficiently represented. Yet, more money needs to be provided so that such states can pay the costs for more than one extra delegate, as the funding for this is usually not enough. Also, multilateral negotiations need to be less demanding in terms of human resources. The number of committees, working groups and other meetings should be well considered in order not to burden smaller delegations. Fewer meetings may lead to more legitimacy in this respect. Finally, the schedule of the negotiations should be less demanding and always fixed, and prevent the meetings from turning into overnight negotiation marathons so that delegates from all states can always participate and get at least some rest. A sense of being just a makeweight does not contribute to the legitimacy of international negotiations, the adopted international norms and, as a result, global governance as such.

---

#### ENDNOTES

- 1 "G8" stands for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States whereas "+5" represents Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (Schroeder – Boykoff – Spiers 2012: 835).
- 2 The authors define an IO as an intergovernmental organization with *"a distinct physical location or website, a formal structure (i.e. a legislative body, executive and bureaucracy), at least thirty permanent staff, a written constitution or convention and a decision body that meets at least once a year"* (Hooghe – Lenz – Marks 2019: 30).
- 3 The Global Environment Facility, the International Criminal Police Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Universal Postal Union, the World Bank, the World Customs Organization, and the World Trade Organization.
- 4 The government effectiveness estimate (World Bank 2020b) ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.
- 5 Factiva (2020) is a global news database of more than 33,000 sources from 200 countries in 28 languages offering thus a high level of data representativeness. As a data source, Factiva is used in a similar kind of research, for instance, by Parizek and Stephen (2019).
- 6 The query was always as follows: "Name of the IO" AND "Name of the country".

- 7 To transform 23 IO-country combinations with zero media hits, the value of one was added to all 3315 dyads.
- 8 Low-income developing countries (LIDCs) "are a group of 59 IMF member countries primarily defined by income per capita level below a certain threshold (set at \$2,700 in 2016)" (International Monetary Fund 2019: 1).
- 9 As the dependent variable is a count variable which can never be negative and which usually has a strong right skew, either Poisson or negative binomial regressions are the most suitable method (Monogan 2015). When applying Poisson regression to the most comprehensive model, Model 5, in Table 2, a dispersion test, whose result should be as close to 1 as possible, equals: 8.09 ( $p < 0.001$ ). Therefore, negative binomial regression (which is more suitable for overdispersed data) is further used instead. To compare the methods, when applying the negative binomial regression to Model 5 in Table 2, the dispersion test result is 1.34 ( $p < 0.001$ ), which indicates that the method used for this model fits the nature of the original data better than Poisson regression.
- 10 Another possible method to tackle autocorrelation would be a multi-level model using IOs as level 2 variables and member states as level 1 variables. This method, however, is not very useful in this particular analysis as there are only seventeen IOs, which reduces level 2 to very few observations.
- 11 Variance inflation factors are lower than 2.2 in all the reported models in Table 2.
- 12 Polity IV data (Marshall 2018) range from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).
- 13 Delegation multiplied by pooling.
- 14 IO size multiplied by IO policy scope.
- 15 The data come from the World Bank databank (World Bank 2020c), range from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.
- 16 The data on the variable come from the Correlates of War database (Pevehouse et al. 2020).
- 17 The variable is measured in kilometres and comes from the GeoDist database (Mayer – Zignago 2011).
- 18 The examples are used for illustrative purposes. To make credible statements about the individual countries based on the value of one variable, the countries would have to report average values on the remaining independent variables, which is unlikely.

## REFERENCES

- B Barnett, Jon – Campbell, John (2010): *Climate Change and Small Island States: Power, Knowledge and the South Pacific*. London: Earthscan, <[https://doi:10.4324/9781849774895](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849774895)>.
- Bátora, Jozef – Hocking, Brian (2009): EU-Oriented Bilateralism: Evaluating the Role of Member State Embassies in the European Union. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 163–182, <[https://doi:10.1080/09557570802683938](https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802683938)>.
- Bertacchini, Enrico – Liuzza, Claudia – Meskell, Lynn (2017): Shifting the Balance of Power in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: An Empirical Assessment. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 331–351, <[https://doi:10.1080/10286632.2015.1048243](https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2015.1048243)>.
- Betzold, Carola – Castro, Paula – Weiler, Florian (2012): AOSIS in the UNFCCC Negotiations: From Unity to Fragmentation? *Climate Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 591–613, <[https://doi:10.1080/14693062.2012.692205](https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.692205)>.

- C Chasek, Pamela S. (2001): NGOs and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The Experience of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 168–176, <<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9388.00273>>.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001): Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 553–588, <<https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180152507551>>.
- Committee on Appropriations (1979): *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- D Depledge, Joanna (2005): *The Organization of Global Negotiations: Constructing the Climate Change Regime*. London: Earthscan.
- F Factiva (2020): Factiva. Dow Jones Professional, *professional.dowjones.com*, <<https://professional.dowjones.com/factiva>>.
- Finnemore, Martha – Jurkovich, Michelle (2014): Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 361–373, <<https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02003003>>.
- H Hooghe, Liesbet – Gary, Marks – Tobias, Lenz – Bezuijen, Jeanine – Ceka, Besir – Derderyan, Svet (2017): *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance*, Volume III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724490.001.0001>>.
- Hooghe, Liesbet – Lenz, Tobias – Marks, Gary (2019): *A Theory of International Organization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198766988.001.0001>>.
- I International Monetary Fund (2019): *Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low-Income Developing Countries – 2019*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, <<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/12/11/Macroeconomic-Developments-and-Prospects-in-Low-Income-Developing-Countries-2019-48872>>.
- K Kaufmann, Daniel – Kraay, Aart – Mastruzzi, Massimo (2011): *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 220–246, <<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404511200046>>.
- Keohane, Robert (1969): Who Cares About the General Assembly? *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 141–149, <<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300025583>>.
- L Lohman, Larry (2006): *Carbon Trading – A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power*. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, <<https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/carbon-trading-critical-conversation-climate-change-privatisation-power/>>.
- M Makina, Anesu (2013): Managing Climate Change: The Africa Group in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations. *Journal of International Organization Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 36–48.
- Mansfield, Edward D. – Milner, Helen V. – Rosendorff, B. Peter (2002): Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 477–513, <<https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199863>>.
- Marshall, Monty G. (2018): *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2018*. Vienna, USA: Center for Systemic Peace.
- Mayer, Thierry – Zignago, Soledad (2011): Notes on CEPII's distances measures: The GeoDist database. *CEPII Working Paper*, Vol. 2011, No. 25, s. 1–47.
- Minang, Peter A. (2009): *Africa in Post 2012 Climate Change Negotiations: Some Policy Perspectives*. Yaoundé: Pan African Parliamentary Conference on Climate Change, <[https://www.slideshare.net/asb\\_partnership/africa-in-post-2012-climate-change-negotiations-some-policy-perspectives](https://www.slideshare.net/asb_partnership/africa-in-post-2012-climate-change-negotiations-some-policy-perspectives)>.



- Minor, Elizabeth (2020): Addressing the Political Impact of Inclusion and Exclusion in Multilateral Disarmament Forums. In: Bolton, Matthew Breay – Sarah, Njeri – Benjamin-Britton, Taylor (eds.): *Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 225–51, <[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27611-9\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27611-9_8)>.
- Monogan, James E. (2015): *Political Analysis Using R (Use R!)*. London: Springer International Publishing, <<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23446-5>>.
- Mumma, Albert (2000): The Poverty of Africa's Position at the Climate Change Convention Negotiations. *UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 181–209.
- N Neeff, Till (2013): How Many Will Attend Paris? UNFCCC COP Participation Patterns 1995–2015. *Environmental Science & Policy*, Vol. 31, pp. 157–159, <<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2013.04.001>>.
- O Onderco, Michal (2019): Variation in Delegation Size in Multilateral Diplomacy. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 421–438, <<https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118819695>>.
- P Panke, Diana – Lang, Stefan – Wiedemann, Anke (2015): Regional Actors in the United Nations: Exploring the Regionalization of International Negotiations. *Global Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 4–5, pp. 431–440, <<https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2015.1109384>>.
- Panke, Diana – Lang, Stefan – Wiedemann, Anke (2017): State and Regional Actors in Complex Governance Systems: Exploring Dynamics of International Negotiations. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 91–112, <<https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148116669904>>.
- Panke, Diana – Lang, Stefan – Wiedemann, Anke (2019): Regional Organisations in the UNGA: Who Is Most Active and Why? *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 744–785, <<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0119-8>>.
- Panke, Diana (2013a): *Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions: Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, <<https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363275>>.
- Panke, Diana (2013b): Getting Ready to Negotiate in International Organizations? On the Importance of the Domestic Construction of National Positions. *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 25–38.
- Panke, Diana (2014): Absenteeism in the General Assembly of the United Nations: Why Some Member States Rarely Vote. *International Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 729–749, <<https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.34>>.
- Panke, Diana (2017a): Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden? Examining State Activity in International Negotiations. *The Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 121–146, <<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9244-1>>.
- Panke, Diana (2017b): Regional Actors in International Security Negotiations. *European Journal for Security Research*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 5–21, <<https://doi.org/10.1007/s41125-016-0010-4>>.
- Panke, Diana (2017c): The Institutional Design of the United Nations General Assembly: An Effective Equalizer? *International Relations*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 3–20, <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117817690567>>.
- Panke, Diana (2020): Regional Cooperation through the Lenses of States: Why Do States Nurture Regional Integration? *The Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 15, pp. 475–504, <<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09348-y>>.
- Parizek, Michal – Stephen, Matthew D. (2019): *From Power to Representation: The Changing Trade-off between Control and Representative Legitimacy in the Staffing of International Organizations*. Presented at the 12th Political Economy of International Organizations Annual Conference, Salzburg.

- Parizek, Michal (2017): Control, Soft Information, and the Politics of International Organizations Staffing. *The Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 559–583, <<https://doi:10.1007/s11558-016-9252-1>>.
- Pevhouse, Jon CW – Nordstrom, Timothy – McManus, Roseanne W – Jamison, Anne Spencer (2020): Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 Datasets. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 492–503, <<https://doi:10.1177/0022343319881175>>.
- Pollack, Mark A. (2006): Rational Choice and EU Politics. In: Jorgensen, Knud Erik – Pollack, Mark A. – Rosamond, Ben (eds.): *Handbook of European Union Politics*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 31–55, <<https://doi:10.4135/9781848607903.n3>>.
- R Richards, Michael (2001): *A Review of the Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation in the Climate Change Convention Negotiations*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Rittberger, Volker – Zangl, Bernhard – Kruck, Andreas – Dijkstra, Hylke (2019): *International Organization* (3rd ed.). London: Red Globe Press.
- Russet, Bruce (1993): *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, <<https://doi:10.1515/9781400821020>>.
- S Scharpf, Fritz W. (1997): *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Schroeder, Heike – Boykoff, Maxwell T. – Spiers, Laura (2012): Equity and State Representations in Climate Negotiations. *Nature Climate Change*, Vol. 2, pp. 834–836, <<https://doi:10.1038/nclimate1742>>.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2010): *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Skovgaard, Jakob – Gallant, Jacqueline (2015): National Delegations to UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties: Who Participates? *Earth System Governance Working Paper No. 35*, <<https://doi:10.13140/RG.2.1.3271.8169>>.
- Surubaru, Neculai-Cristian (2017): Administrative Capacity or Quality of Political Governance? EU Cohesion Policy in the New Europe, 2007–13. *Regional Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 844–856, <<https://doi:10.1080/00343404.2016.1246798>>.
- T Tosun, Jale (2014): Absorption of Regional Funds: A Comparative Analysis. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 371–387, <<https://doi:10.1111/jcms.12088>>.
- U United Nations (2001): General Assembly Resolution 55/7: Oceans and the Law of the Sea. *undocs.org*, <<https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/55/7>>.
- United Nations (2020a): UN Charter. *un.org*, <<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/>>.
- United Nations (2020b): Rules of Procedure and Comments. *un.org*, <<https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/index.shtml>>.
- V Vanhanen, Tatu (2019): Measures of Democracy 1810-2018. Tampere: *Finnish Social Science Data Archive*, <<http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:fsd:T-FSD1289>>.
- W Wendt, Alexander (2001): *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- World Bank (2020a): GDP (current US\$). *data.worldbank.org*, <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>>.
- World Bank (2020b): World Governance Indicators. *info.worldbank.org*, <<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>>.
- World Bank (2020c): Control Of Corruption: Estimate. *datbank.worldbank.org*, <<https://datbank.worldbank.org/databases/control-of-corruption>>.

- 
- Y Yamin, Farhana – Depledge, Joanna (2004): *The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, <<https://doi:10.1017/CBO9780511494659>>.
- Z Zartman, I. William (1994): *Two's Company and More's a Crowd: The Complexities of Multilateral Negotiation*. *International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 1–10.
- 

## NOTE

*The study was supported by Charles University, namely by the Grant Agency of Charles University (project no. 26119: Who Sits at The Table? States Representation in International Organizations), and grant SVV 260 595: Political order in the times of changes. I am grateful to Michal Parizek, Ph.D. and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.*

---

## AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Václav Vlček is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Studies, the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. His areas of interest are international organizations and the European Union. In his recent research, he focuses on national delegations to plenary meetings of international organizations and ministers' participation in the Council of the EU meetings.